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NOTES
WILL RENUNCIATION OF A BEQUEST OR FAILURE TO CLAIM
A STATUTORY SHARE CONSTITUTE A TAXABLE GIFT?
In 1948 the 80th Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code in an
effort to eliminate the discrimination theretofore enjoyed by residents of
states which had adopted the community property system.' Substantial equalization in the estate and gift tax fields is expected to follow from the marital
deduction and "gift tax splitting" privileges. 2 Moreover, these changes have
focused attention upon a problem which caused considerable concern to
conservative tax advisors even before the 1948 Tax Amendment. It has long
been a doubtful question whether the renunciation of testamentary benefits
would be held to constitute a taxable gift. The Act and the proposed regulations make it reasonably clear that a widow will not incur a gift tax as a
result of renouncing a bequest or failing to claim her statutory share. 3 But
what of a child who (1) renounces a legacy, or (2) fails to claim a statutory
share where such right exists because of his parent's failure to mention him
in the will? Will he be deemed to have made a taxable gift? The purpose of
this note is to analyze the probable basis of gift tax liability in these two
latter situations.
I. WHEN IS A TRANSFER A GIFT?

In property cases decided according to principles of common law the
courts will find a gift only where there is (1) a donor with legal capacity to
make a gift, (2) a donee who accepts the gift, (3) a donative intent, and
(4) an absence of consideration. 4 However, Congress and the courts have
given the term "gift" a much broader meaning in the appplication of the tax
statutes.5 While there is apparently no deviation in the requirement that there
be a competent donee, there have been radical changes in the other major
elements of a gift so long considered necessary at common law.
1. H. R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1948) ;
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1948).

SEN.

REP,. No. 1013, 80th

2. Ibid.; Sugarman, Estate and Gift Tax Equalization-The Marital Deduction, 36

L. REv. 223 (1948) ; Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of
1948, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1097 (1948).
3. INT. REV. CODE § 812(e) (4) ; Proposed Estate Tax Reg., 13 FED. REG. 6564 (1948);
3 P-H 1948 FED. TAX SERV. 125,401.
4. Edson v. Lucas, 40 F. 2d 398 (C. C. A. 8th 1930) ; Combs v. Roark's Adm'r, 221
Ky. 679, 299 S. W. 576 (1927) ; In re Greenberg's Will, 286 N. Y. Supp. 56, 158 Misc.
446 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
5. Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303, 65 Sup. Ct. 652, 89 L. Ed. 958 (1945) ; Smith
v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176, 63 Sup. Ct. 545, 87 L. Ed. 690 (1943) ; Comm'r v. Hogle,.
165 F. 2d 352 (C. C. A. 10th 1947) ; Comm'r v. Beck's Estate, 129 F. 2d 243 (C. C. A.
2d 1942).
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The often-repeated requirement that the donor have legal capacity may
be questioned since from early times courts of equity, under certain circumstances, have authorized the gratuitous transfer of an incompetent's property.6 In City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowanj, the Supreme Court
left no doubt that a tax could be imposed upon such transfers. In that case
property of an incompetent was transferred pursuant to a court order, the
court by statute being empowered to act as parens patriae. The Supreme
Court held that the transfer was a gift in contemplation of death, stating that
where "the court is to substitute itself as nearly as may be. for the incompetent,
and to act upon the same motives and consideration as would have moved
her, the transfer is, in legal effect, her act and the motive is hers." 8
The Supreme Court negatived .two further essential elements of a common law gift in Commissioner v. Wemyss 9 and Merrill v. Fahs.'0 These
cases, decided on the same day, involved elements of donative intent and
consideration. In the Wernyss case a widow was beneficiary of a trust so long
as she remained unmarried. She subsequently entered into a prenuptial contract with her proposed second husband whereby he transferred to her sufficient
securities to make'up for the loss of the trust income which she would suffer
upon her marriage to him. The Court held that the transfer of the securities was
a "gift" under sections 501 and 503 of the Internal Revenue Code 11 and
that the transferor received no money equivalent even though the transferee
suffered a substantial detriment in giving up her life benefits from the trust.
In interpreting these sections, the Court stated: "Had Congress taxed 'gifts'
simpliciter, it would be appropriate to assume that the term was used in its
colloquial sense, and a search for 'donative intent' would be indicated. But
Congress intended to use the term 'gifts' in its broadest and most comprehensive sense. . . . Congress chose not to require an ascertainment of what
too often is an elusive state of mind. For purposes of the gift tax it not only
dispensed with the test of,'donative intent.' It formulated a much more workable external test, that where 'property is transferred for less than an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth,' the excess in such money

6. In re Hudelson, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P. 2d 805 (1941) ; In re Flagler, 248 N. Y.
415, 162 N. E. 471 (1928) ; In re Carysfort, Craig & Ph. 76, 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ch. 1840) ;
32 C. J., Insane Persons § 435 (1923). See Notes, 160 A. L. R. 1435 (1946), 59 A. L. R.
653 (1929).
7. 323 U. S.594, 65 Sup. Ct. 496, 89 L. Ed. 483 (1945).
8. Id. at 599. See also, Comm'r v. Greene, 119 F. 2d 383 (C. C. A. 9th 1941) ; City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hoey, 101 F. 2d 9, 10 (C. C. A. 2d 1939) ("It is clear ...
that the transfers of the property of the incompetent to her daughter and to her grandchildren were gifts").
9. 324 U. S. 303, 65 Sup. Ct. 652, 89 L. Ed. 958 (1945) ; 1 TAx L. REv. 107 (1945).
10. 324 U. S.308, 65 Sup. Ct. 655, 89 L. Ed. 963 (1945); 19 TEmI'LE L. Q. 513
(1946).
11. These sections are now §§ 1000, 1002 of the INT. REv. CODE.
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value 'shall, for the purpose of the tax imposed by this title, be deemed
a gift.' " 12
The question then is: What is the meaning of "in money or money's
worth" for purposes of gift taxation? According to Treasury Department interpretation of section 1002 "consideration not reducible to a money value,
as love and affection, promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly disregarded .... ," 13 Apparently this would suggest that a consideration measurable in monetary terms and sufficient to -create a valid contract at common law
would not be disregarded: However, in the Merrill case 14 the Supreme Court
held that a 'relinquishment of dower rights, which was adequate consideration
to create an enforceable contract at common law, was not consideration in
money or money's worth. These two decisions emphasize the Court's disregard of the traditional common law requirements of a gift. In dispensing
with these requirements, Congress' purpose was construed to impose gift
tax liability on any inter vivos transfer of property where the transferor does
not receive in return the equivalent value, in money or money's worth, of
the property transferred. 15
Brown v. Routzahn,16 decided on a fact situation that arose prior to the
passage of the gift tax sections of the Code, suggests that even in tax law
the requirement that the donee must accept the gift may still be important.
In that case the Tax Board, affirming the Commissioner, held that the husband's renunciation of a bequest given in lieu of curtesy was a gift in
contemplation of death to the residuary legatee. In reversing, the circuit court
of appeals pointed out that the "decedent never. :. had control of the property
as donee. All that he had was a right to accept . . . [and] an equal right to
reject ....
He did reject. ... What it [the Government] did was to collect

a tax, not upon the transfer of an interest in property, but upon the exercise
of a right to refuse a gift of the property. This we think it had no right to
do." 17 It may well be questioned, however, whether the court would apply
the rigid common law rules of property to this factual situation today.
II. THE 1948

AMENDMENT

Because the gift tax was passed to tax transfers of property which escaped
taxation on the donor's death, the Court on numerous occasions has held that
12. Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303, 306, 65 Sup. Ct. 652, 89 L. Ed. 958 (1945).
For a discussion of this "more workable external test" see Rand, What is a Gift? 34
Ky. L. J. 99 (1946).
13. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.8.
14. 324 U. S. 308, 65 Sup. Ct. 655, 89 L. Ed. 963 (1945).
15. Comm'r v. Wernyss, 324 U. S. 303, 65 Sup. Ct. 652, 89 L. Ed. 958 (1945);
Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U. S. 308, 65 Sup. Ct. 655, 89 L. Ed. 963 (1945) ; Comm'r v. Bristol,
121 F. 2d 129 (C. C. A. 1st 1941) ; H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1932);
SEN. REP. No. 655, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1932).
16. 63 F. 2d 914 (C. C. A. 6th 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S.'641 (1933).
17. Id. at 917.
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the estate tax and gift tax provisions must be considered in pari materia.18
Thus consideration of the estate tax sections of the Code-particularly the
1948 Amendment-is relevant in an analysis of possible gift tax liability.
Section 812 (e) (4) deals with disclaimer by a spouse or any other person.
While the obvious purpose of Congress in passing this section was to prevent widespread avoidance of estate tax by post-mortem reallocations within
the family group to obtain the maximum marital deduction, the language used
also indicates the status of such spouse or third person with respect to
possible gift tax liability.
Part (A) of section 812(e) (4) provides that where a spouse renounces
a bequest, or refuses a statutory share, such bequest or share is to be considered as having passed directly from the decedent to the person receiving
such interest. 19 The Treasury Department, in the recently proposed Estate
Tax Regulations, treats fully the nature of such disclaimer and further emphasizes that the interest disclaimed will not be treated as passing to or
through the spouse. 20 The objective here is to limit the availability of the
marital deduction. In view of these express pronouncements of Congress
and the Treasury Department, it seems reasonably clear that a spouse will
not be subject to a gift tax on the transfer of an interest which is regarded
as never passing to her.
Part (B) of section 812(e) (4), however, dealing with renunciation
by "any person other than a surviving spouse," suggests the opposite result.21 This section provides that when any person other than a surviving
18. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U. S.308, 65 Sup. Ct. 655, 89 L. Ed. 963 (1945) ; Smith v.
Shaughnessy, 318 U. S.176, 63 Sup. Ct. 545, 87 L. Ed. 690 (1943) ; Sanford v. Comm'r,
308 U. S.39, 60 Sup. Ct 51, 84 L. Ed. 20 (1939); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S.
280, 53 Sup. Ct. 369, 66 L. Ed. 748 (1933) ; H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28
(1932) ; SEN. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). See also Warren, Corrclation;ol
Gift and Estate Taxes, 55 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1941).
19. "(A) By surviving Spouse.-If under this subsection an interest would, in the
absence of a disclaimer by the surviving spouse, be considered as passing from the dc.cedent to such spouse, and if a disclaimer of such interest is made by such spouse, then
such interest shall, for the purposes of this subsection, be considered as passing to the
person or persons entitled to receive such interest as a result of the disclaimer." INT. REV.

§ 812(e) (4).
20. "Sec. 812(e) (4) (A) provides that where the surviving spouse makes a disclaimer of any property interest which would otherwise be considered as having passed
from the decedent to such spouse, such disclaimed interest is to be considered as having
passed from the decedent to the person or persons entitled to receive such interest as a reCoDE

sult of the disclaimer. A disclaimer is a complete and unqualified refusal to accept the
rights to which one is entitled....

"Where the surviving spouse is obliged to elect between a property interest offered

to her under the decedent's will or other instrument and a property interest to which she
is entitled ... of which adverse disposition vas attempted under such will or other instrument, the property interest which such spouse elects to renounce or relinquish is not
considered as having 'passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse.'" Proposed Estate Tax. Reg., 13 FED. R n.6564 (1948), 3 P-H 1948 FE. TAX SERV. 125,401.
21. "(B) Disclaimer By Any Other Person-If under this subsection an interest
would, in the absence of a disclaimer by any person other than the surviving spouse, be
considered as passing from the decedent to such person, and if a disclaimer of such interest is made by such person and as a result of such disclaimer the surviving spouse
is entitled to receive such interest, then such interest shall, for the purposes of this sub-
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spouse disclaims, and the interest so disclaimed passes to the surviving
spouse,22 the interest 'is treated as passing from the decedent to the disclaimant.
As this interest for estate tax purposes passes to the disclaimant, and as the
surviving spouse actually acquires title to this property, the logical application
of this section would suggest a gift tax on the shift of interest from the disclaimant to the parent. There will be, however, few instances where children
of the decedent will disclaim in favor of their parent because the marital
deduction would not be available if the parent receives the interest as the
result of a disclaimer. The common situation will be where the testator leaves
his entire estate to his spouse with no provision for or mention of the children.
Under the law of practically all stateg any child born after the execution of
the will may claim his intestate share; and, in a large number of the states
any child not mentioned in the will, even if living at the date of its execution,
23
may likewise claim his intestate share.
This approach to the disclaimer problem seems equally applicable here,
i.e., that the failure to claim will not prevent the imposition of a gift tax unless
there is some merit to the distinction between action and non-action. Such
distinction fails if liability is based on the doctrine of constructive receipt.
The doctrine of constructive 'receipt has received wide recognition in
the field of income taxation. 24 In Corliss v.- Bowers,2 5 an early income tax
opinion involving the taxation of income to the grantor of a revocable trust, Mr.
Justice Holmes stated: "The income that is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his own option, may be taxed to him as his
own income whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not." 26 Thus, the fact that a person does not actually receive income will not necessarily exempt him from insection be considered as passing, not to the surviving spouse, but to the person who made

the disclaimer, in the same manner as if the disclaimer had not been made." INT. RiEv.
GODE § 812(e) (4).
22. Neither the Act nor the proposed regulations deal with the situation where on
disclaimer the interest passes to a person other than a spouse since this is immaterial for

estate tax purposes.

23. ATxINSON, WILLS 95 (1937); 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 113, 116
(1936) ; Mathews, PreterinittedHeirs: An Analysis of Statutes, 29 COL. L. REv. 748

(1929).
24. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S.376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336, 74 L. Ed. 916 (1930) ; Blum v.
Higgins, 150 F. 2d 471 (C. C. A. 2d 1945) ; Loose v. United States, 74 F. 2d 147 (C. C. A.
8th 1934) ; Schoenheit v. Lucas, 44 F. 2d 476 (C. C. A. 4th 1930) ; Zysman, Constructive
Receipt of Income, 16 TAx MAG. 715 (1938); Kaplan, The Doctrine of Constructive
Receipt-Some Observations, 19 TAXES 547 (1941); 2 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOME
TAXATiO N §§ 10.01-10.18 (1942).

This doctrine has been incorporated into U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.42-2, which
states: "Income which is credited to the account of or set apart for a taxpayer and which
may be drawn upon by him at any time is subject to tax for the year during which so
credited or set apart, although not then actually reduced to possession. To constitute receipt

in such a case the income must be credited or set apart to the taxpayer without any sub-.
stantial limitation or restriction as to the time or manner of payment or condition upon
which payment is to be made, and must be made available to him so that it may be drawn
at any time, and its receipt brought within his own control and disposition."
25. 281 U. S.376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336, 74 L. Ed. 916 (1930).
26. Id. at 378.
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come tax liability. The test is simple: Is the income available to the taxpayer;
is it unqualifiedly subject to the taxpayer's demand? 27
Will the doctrine be extended to other fields of taxation? It never
developed in the estate tax field because prior to 1942 the statute specifically
required the exercise of a general power of appointment before the property
subject to the power could be included in the gross estate. 28 Thus Congress
indicated that the mere power to dispose of property should not be taxed.
Here was a statutory prohibition to the application of the doctrine of constructive receipt. In 1942, Congress amended section 302(f) and included
within the coverage of the tax all property subject to powers (other than
specifically defined limited powers), whether exercised or not.29 Thus the
occasion for the application of this judicially developed doctrine has never
arisen.
In view of the estate tax regulation dealing with disclaimer by persons
other than spouses,- there appears to be a strong likelihood that the courts
will extend this doctrine to situations where the husband dies leaving a will
and there is a pretermitted child, or, a child living at the time the will was
executed but who is not mentioned in the will.30 If he does not claim his
statutory share, should he be held to have so constructively received it that
its devolution to another under the will of the parent will constitute a taxable
gift? 31 Is it any less subject to his "unfettered command"? Is he any less
27. Loose v. United States, 74 F. 2d 147 (C. C. A. 8th 1934) (citing numerous cases
applying this test); 1 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 9.02
(1934).

28. "Sec. 32. The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated....
"(f) To the extent of any property passing under a general power of appointment
exercised by the decedent (1) by will, or (2) by deed executed in contemplation of, or
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after, his death, except in case of a
bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth....
44 STAT. 70, 71 (1926).
The Supreme Court in Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 155, 55 Sup. Ct. 324,
79 L. Ed. 825 (1935) poifited out that "[t]he crucial words are 'property passing under a
general power of appointment exercised by the decedent by will.' Analysis of this clause
discloses three distinct requisites-(1) the existence of a general power of appointment;
(2) an exercise of that power by the decedent by will; and (3) the passing of the property
in virtue of such exercise."
29. This section is now § 811 (f) of the INT. REV. CODE. "The value of the gross estate
of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real property
situated outside of the United States...

"(f) Powers of Appointment."(1) In general.---:To the extent of any property (A) with respect to which the de.
cedent has at the time of his death a power of appointment, or (B) with respect to which
he has at any time exercised' or released a power of appointment in contemplation of
death, or (C) with respect to which he has at any time exercised or released a power
of appointment by a disposition intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after his death, or by a disposition under which he has retained for his life or any period
not ascertainable without reference to his death. . .
30. See note 23 supra.
31. He is treated as having constructively received it for estate tax purposes.
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"free to enjoy [it] at his own option" than was the grantor in Corliss v.
Bowers? 32
It may be argued that this doctrine should not apply to gift taxation because it disregards the privilege of such child to reject or waive his statutory
rights. 33 But this objection to gift tax liability seems formal and technical
in the light of our developing tax philosophy where the emphasis is on control,
not title; on practicalities, not technicalities. The law of taxation "is not so
much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual control over
the property taxed . . ." 34 and the courts will look through legal niceties and
formal dispositions of property in order properly to affix tax liability.
In the situation where a child is entitled to a statutory, share, he is the
only person who has power to control its disposition. If he accepts the share
and then gives it away, clearly he would be subject to gift tax liability. If he
fails to take this .share and permits it to go to another, is it not equally clear
that he has made a gift? Here also he had complete power to control the
disposition of the property'. That he exercised this power in a negative rather
than a positive manner in the transfer of the interest should not preclude the
imposition of a gift tax. The end result is the same, i.e., the transfer of the
interest to the residuary legatee at the sole pleasure of the pretermitted heir
or omitted child.
CONCLUSION

Because the courts may apply the doctrine of constructive receipt to
situations where there is a pretermitted or omitted child, conservative tax
advisors should take steps to avoid this possible basis of gift tax liability.
One practical solution to the problem is to examine all wills in light of state
statutes to determine if they contain references t6 existing and pretermitted
children. Express mention of such children is enough to deprive them of any
statutory share of their parents' estate.3 5 If the children have no right to a
statutory share, they clearly have no interest subject to their unqualified
control. And as there is no unqualified control, there is no basis for the application of the constructive receipt doctrine.
DANIEL D. CANALE
ROBERT E. COOPER
32. 281 U. S. 376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336, 74 L. Ed. 916 (1930).
33. Cerf v. Comm'r, 141 F. 2d 564 (C. C. A. 3rd 1944); Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.
2d 914 (C. C. A. 6th 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 641 (1933).
34. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378, 50 Sup. Ct. 336, 74 L. Ed. 916 (1930);
Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, "53 Sup. Ct. 369, 77 L. Ed. 748 (1933) ; Chase Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126, 73 L. Ed. 405, 63 A. L. R. 388
(1929) ; Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225, 72 L. Ed. 565 (1928);
Sunnen v. Comm'r, 333 U. S. 591, 68 Sup. Ct. 855, 92 L. Ed. 673 (1948).
35. 1 PAGE, WILLS § 528 (3d ed. 1941) ; ATKI.SON, WILLS § 47 (1937).

